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Grist for the Sceptic’s Mill: Rwanda and
the African Peer Review Mechanism
Eduard Jordaan
However much Ian Taylor’s (2005) authoritative book on the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) wants to be upbeat about the possibility that
this ambitious plan will lead to Africa’s revival, the gap between rhetoric and re-
ality leaves him hardly able to express any such hope. Taylor is particularly pes-
simistic about the likelihood that NEPAD and its flagship initiative, the African
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), will lead to greater democratisation and re-
spect for human rights, an assessment he bases on the dubious democratic cre-
dentials and commitments of most of NEPAD and Africa’s leaders and the
strength of this elite’s pan-African solidarity, and on the view that NEPAD’s
commitments will not be able to displace the neopatrimonial governance that
characterises most African states (also Chabal 2002). On the whole, I agree with
Taylor’s diagnosis of NEPAD and the APRM. But, because the APRM is still in
its infancy, because it is still not clear how the process would actually work, be-
cause it has been conducted in a manner so opaque and inaccessible as to border
on secrecy, and because the process has moved along since Taylor’s book was
written, we might wonder if his scepticism has been premature. A particularly
important step for NEPAD has been the completion of the APRM process by
three countries (Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda), which makes it possible to base an
evaluation of the likelihood that the APRM will lead to greater democratisation
on evidence somewhat more substantial. Rwanda, as the least democratic country
of the three that have completed the process – it is the only one of the three that
Freedom House (2006) rates as ‘unfree’ – offers a particularly good opportunity
to investigate the ability and resolve of the APRM to secure constitutional de-
mocracy with effective checks and balances, and respect for human rights and for
the rule of law in participating countries (NEPAD Secretariat 2003c).
This article intends to show that it is extremely unlikely that the APRM will bend
Rwanda towards greater democracy and respect for political freedom, for at least
three reasons. First, the APRM lacks the ability and the will to force deeper de-
mocratisation and respect for political rights on a recalcitrant Rwandan govern-
ment. Second, the APRM holds a rather sanguine view of political governance in
Rwanda. To be sure, the country review team (CRT) to Rwanda had some unflat-
tering things to say about the state of democracy and political freedom in the
country. Neverthess, much of the criticism is qualified and wavering, couched in
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narrow technocratic language, naïve in that it views the mere creation of new in-
stitutions and laws as evidence of democratic commitment, and, most problem-
atically, withdrawn during the latter stages of the peer review process. Third, the
APR Heads of State Forum (APR Forum), the highest decision-making body in
the APRM, has already ratified a Rwandan programme of action that ignores is-
sues of democracy and political freedom, even though the programme of action is
the document in which the country under review is supposed to outline how it in-
tends to meet the commitments stipulated in the foundational NEPAD Declara-
tion on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. The timidity
and helplessness of the peer reviewers in the face of an oppressive but unrepen-
tant Rwandan government therefore continues to cast serious doubts on the integ-
rity, meaningfulness and value of the APRM. It is, however, not clear what
significance the failure of the APRM in Rwanda holds for the wider NEPAD ini-
tiative, especially since the APRM seems to function quite autonomously from
NEPAD, while ‘NEPAD’, in turn, entails little more than the slapping of an insti-
tutional affiliation onto various quite independent development projects through-
out Africa (see NEPAD Secretariat 2006b).
This article consists of six further sections. Section one gives a brief overview of
the five stages of the APRM and also discusses the powerlessness of the APRM.
Section two focuses on the flaws in Rwanda’s self-assessment process (stage one
of the APRM process), while section three considers the findings of the country
review mission to Rwanda (stages two and three). Section four considers the
Rwandan government’s response to the country review team findings (part of
stage three). Section five addresses the withdrawal of much of the country review
team’s earlier criticism by the Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel), as well as
the gaps in the Rwandan government’s final (and ratified) programme of action
(stages four and five). Section six offers a brief conclusion.
The Meekness of the APRM
The African peer review process consists of five stages. During stage one, the
country under review writes a report in which it assesses its performance in four
thematic areas: democracy and good political governance (although the word
‘good’ is dropped in certain documents, for example, NEPAD Secretariat 2003c),
economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-eco-
nomic development. Part of the first stage is the drafting of a programme of ac-
tion that describes how the country under review intends to address the
governance shortcomings that were exposed during the self-assessment process.
During stage two, a CRT visits the country, where it conducts “the widest possi-
ble range of consultations” (NEPAD Secretariat 2002a) with members of the
government, parliament, political parties, civil society, and international organi-
sations. During stage three, under the auspices of the APR Panel, the CRT pre-
pares a report based on desk research and information obtained during their
meetings in stage two. As part of stage three
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[t]he draft report is first discussed with the government concerned. Those
discussions will be designed to ensure the accuracy of the information
and to provide the government with an opportunity to react to the APR
team’s findings and to put forward its own views on how the identified
shortcomings may be addressed. These responses of the government will
be appended to the Team’s report. (NEPAD Secretariat 2003b:8)
This is an extremely worrying step for its wilful exclusion of civil society over-
sight in a process that professes to be participatory, strengthening Taylor’s suspi-
cion that the APRM is unlikely to jeopardise solidarity among Africa’s elites
(Taylor 2005:67–74). During stage four the APR Panel’s report and the final
programme of action are sent to the APR Forum “for consideration and formula-
tion of actions deemed necessary in accordance with the mandate of the APR Fo-
rum” (NEPAD Secretariat 2003b:1). The fifth stage entails the formal and public
tabling of the report in select African structures, such as the Pan-African Parlia-
ment, which is to take place at least six months after the report was considered by
the APR Forum.
From the onset, questions were raised about the APRM’s ability to ensure com-
pliance with NEPAD principles of democracy and political freedom, reservations
that were set against a history that saw African governments trample on these
principles without fear of rebuke by other governments on the continent
(Kanuma 2002; Olukoshi 2002). To assuage these concerns, the APRM base doc-
ument includes the promise that, failing constructive dialogue, “appropriate mea-
sures” will be taken against governments that do not display “the necessary
political will” to “rectify the identified shortcomings” (NEPAD Secretariat
2002a). However, the content of these “appropriate measures” has never been
specified. Furthermore, in later documents, reference to “appropriate measures”
has been removed (for example, NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:21). At one point it
seemed as though countries that failed to comply with APRM standards would
forfeit a certain amount of foreign aid, given that NEPAD pledged “to urge donor
governments and agencies ... to come to the assistance” of those countries that
showed a “demonstrable will” to address identified governance deficiencies
(NEPAD Secretariat 2002a; ibid 2006a:21–2). However, even a punitive measure
as mild as losing out on a potential increase in aid has been disavowed. In a re-
cent press statement, the Executive Director of the APRM Secretariat, Bernard
Kouassi, iterated that, since the APRM is
[a] peer learning and experience sharing process, it should not be inter-
preted as a score card of pass or fail, or a conditionality for donor assis-
tance. It may be that some donors and development partners could use the
results of the APRM assessments or reviews to make decisions on aid and
development assistance, but this is not the primary purpose of the APRM
nor its intention. (NEPAD Secretariat 2005c)
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Having renounced all punitive capabilities, the APRM now describes its role in
the introduction to the Rwandan country review report in the following way:
It must be stated that it was not a function of the CRM [Country Review
Mission] or Panel to make its own assessments of the situation in
Rwanda. The task of the CRM in the APR process is indeed clearly iden-
tified in the AU Document on the African Peer Review Mechanism Or-
ganisation and Procedures: ‘The visit is an opportunity for the APRM
Team to discuss the draft Programme of Action that the country has
drawn up to improve their governance and socio-economic development,
to provide positive reinforcement for the sound aspects, and to address
identified weaknesses and shortcomings in the various areas of gover-
nance and development’. The main emphasis in the process rests with
what the country itself is prepared and able to produce. The APRM is, af-
ter all, structured on the non-negotiable principles of national ownership
and leadership, and self-assessment. (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:27, em-
phasis added)
In short, even the “peer learning and experience sharing” element of the APRM
has been reduced; paradoxically we are informed that peer review is “structured
on” self-review. This leaves one to wonder about the relevance of bodies such as
the APR Panel and the APR Forum, which stand relieved of burdens of authority
and ensuring compliance with NEPAD standards.
A generous interpretation of this reduction of external or peer authority and re-
sponsibility vis-à-vis that of the government under review would be that it stems
from an acknowledgement that an “ongoing dialogue” between peers and the
government under review is a misnomer, as the Rwandan experience illustrates.
After acceding to the APRM on March 9, 2003, the actual process was kicked off
a year later (March 24–26, 2004) when about 200 “stakeholders” held their first
workshop in Kigali. Official peer interaction between Rwanda and the continen-
tal APRM structures consisted of a visit by an advance team to assess Rwanda’s
preparedness to receive a support mission (February 9–12, 2004); a brief country
support mission (June 21–24, 2004); a sharing of country experiences in Algeria
(November 20–21, 2004); a country review mission (April 18–30, 2005, see be-
low); a meeting with the APR Panel in Abuja (June 17, 2005); the presentation of
the draft country review report to the APR Forum on June 19, 2005; an experi-
ence-sharing session at the Sixth Africa Governance Forum, which had the
theme “The African Peer Review Mechanism: Challenges and Opportunities”
(May 9–11, 2006); and a two-hour “peer review” during the ratification of
Rwanda’s country report and programme of action by African heads of state
at the Fifth Summit of the APRM Forum in Banjul on June 30, 2006. Whichever
dates one takes as the beginning and the end of the Rwandan peer review process,
it should be clear that official peer interaction has been minimal. Of course, inter-
action between Rwanda’s NEPAD structures and those at the continental level
took place outside of these official events, and it is instructive to read the
Rwandan evaluation thereof:
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[T]hroughout the process, there was regular liaison between the National
Focal Point and the APRM Panel of Experts as well as the continental
secretariat who offered support despite the fact that they tend to be too in-
accessible. Since 2003 when a number of countries acceded to the APRM
no attempt has been made to establish a regular communication link
amongst those countries that have come on board on APRM [sic].
(Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:9)
Regardless of the extent of opportunities for “peer learning and experience shar-
ing” in the APRM, what we are left with is a creature bereft of any enforcing
power and which puts its faith in the good intentions of the governments under
review. Such trust in African governments contradicts the mistrust of these gov-
ernments that motivated the creation of a body to review their governance exter-
nally in the first place. It also backtracks on earlier promises that the APRM
would contain a disciplinary element, which is how it was sold to the interna-
tional donor community (Cilliers 2002; Taylor 2005:64). What is more, the rest-
ing of the process on “what the country itself is prepared and able to produce”
seems a rather naïve strategy, if one considers that
the logic and the modus operandi of neopatrimonial rule and the domi-
nance and nature of extractive economies in Africa, and their relation-
ships with the international system, mean that NEPAD’s strictures on
good governance and democracy cannot be implemented without erod-
ing the very nature of the postcolonial African state and undermining the
positions of the incumbent elites – an unlikely possibility. (Taylor
2005:46)
One of the dangers of leaving the process in the hands of African governments,
while NEPAD’s officials and Africa’s political leaders pretend that significant
external review is taking place, is that it enables autocratic leaders such as the
Rwandan President Paul Kagame to pretend great openness, by declaiming,
“Never before have statesmen and stateswomen, who are still in power, ever sub-
jected themselves voluntarily to both internal as well as external scrutiny. And
that is what African leaders set out to do” (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat 2006b:2).
But be that as it may, in the case of the Rwandan peer review, the ability of the
APRM to get a recalcitrant government to change was never put to the test as
Rwanda’s peers took the path of least resistance by (in the end) adapting their
evaluation to concur with the Rwandan government’s point of view.
Rwanda’s Skewed Self-Assessment
The way Rwanda went about organising its self-evaluation process, as part of the
first stage of the APRM process, was a harbinger of the self-assessment report to
come. Realising that the initial group of 200 people would be too unwieldy to an-
swer the 88-page questionnaire upon which the country self-assessment report
would be based, it was decided to form four technical review teams (TRTs),
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which would each write a chapter on one of the four thematic areas (democracy
and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate gov-
ernance, and socio-economic development). A 50-member National Commission
was formed to lead the APRM process and to oversee and assist in the work of
the TRTs. The APRM country support mission to Rwanda, whose visit coincided
with the inauguration of Rwanda’s National Commission, immediately expressed
their concern that the National Commission “had too many government officials
which may compromise the independence of the commission” (NEPAD Secretar-
iat 2004). Indeed, more than 60 per cent of the National Commission consisted of
government officials. Furthermore, the TRT responsible for writing the chapter
on democracy and good political governance consisted of four members, all of
whom had close links to the government (Jordaan 2006:337–40; NEPAD Secre-
tariat 2004; Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat 2004:14–16). The country support mis-
sion proposed that the government’s dominance on the National Commission be
reduced through the creation of an ‘executive bureau’ within the National Com-
mission and which would consist of around 10 members, only one or two of
whom were to be from the public sector (NEPAD Secretariat 2004). However,
the Rwandans did not implement this suggestion.
The hope that the civil society representatives who did make it onto the National
Commission would offer an independent and countervailing force on a body
dominated by government officials would also be disappointed, for a number of
reasons. First, a number of ‘civil society representatives’ on the National Com-
mission, such as the former governor of Rwanda’s central bank and the rector of
the School of Finance and Banking, owed their positions to presidential appoint-
ment, as determined by Article 113 of the Constitution. Second, various civil so-
ciety representatives were only nominally independent of the government; for
example, the president of Pro-Femmes, an umbrella organisation for women’s
groups that had previously taken the side of the Rwandan government (and the
National Commission for Human Rights!) in accusing Human Rights Watch of
being ‘divisive’1 (Front Line 2005:36; US Department of State 2004), and Silas
Sinyigaya, the executive secretary of the human rights’ umbrella organisation
CLADHO (Federation of Leagues and Associations for the Defence of Human
Rights in Rwanda), who the human rights organisation Front Line has described
as “openly pro-government” (Front Line 2005:35). Third, although the Rwandan
government’s claim that the self-assessment process “was so participatory that all
sectors were players and none spectators” (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat
2006a:12), a number of organisations that enjoy international respect for their in-
dependence, such as the newspaper Umeseso and the human rights organisation,
LIPRODHOR (Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defence of Human
Rights) were all but absent from the process. In fact, their non-participation
should come as little surprise, given the government’s persecution of these two
organisations (see, for example, Front Line 2005). Fourth, when members of civil
society from beyond the National Commission were invited to participate in the
self-assessment process, such as during a one-day workshop (September 28,
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2004) conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs, partici-
pants felt too scared to speak openly (Gruzd, forthcoming). Fifth, Rwanda’s
self-assessment process took place in a very illiberal political atmosphere (Am-
nesty International 2004, 2005; US Department of State 2005), which was defi-
nitely not conducive to the frank self-criticism required by the APRM.
Given that the process whereby Rwanda’s country self-assessment report
(CSAR) came to be written was dominated by government officials, it came as
little surprise that this report presented a rather cheery and implausible view of
political governance in the country. For example, the compilers of the Rwandan
CSAR tell us that “the real causes of the conflict between Rwanda and Uganda
were unclear” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:34)2 when it is no secret their competi-
tion for the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s mineral wealth lay at the heart
of problem (United Nations 2003:17; Amnesty International 2003); that
“Rwanda is making significant progress towards achieving constitutional democ-
racy” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:36), even though the country is still rated as
‘unfree’ by Freedom House and whatever formal political opposition to the rul-
ing Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) there was has been dismantled; that the
“groundbreaking referendum” on a constitution in May 2003 and the presidential
and parliamentary elections later that same year “legitimated the current regime”
(ibid), even though the constitutional referendum was “state-managed”
(Reyntjens 2004:185) and ratified a document that contained elements that re-
stricted political freedom and that were open to abuse (European Union Electoral
Observer Mission 2003a:6), while the elections of 2003 have been described as
nothing more than “a cosmetic operation for international consumption”
(Reyntjens 2004:186); that the country aspires to a “respect for human rights con-
sistent with those advanced by the United Nations” (NEPAD Secretariat
2006a:36) even though the RPF remains unable or unwilling to recognise the
gross human rights violations it has committed (see, for example, Des Forges
1999); that the country seeks “to foster certain principles” to ensure that the “po-
litical activity of individuals and organisations does not threaten the national
unity” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:36), which in practice is interpreted so nar-
rowly that mere criticism of the government is viewed as a crime of `division-
ism’, even when these criticisms have pertained to “taxation, insurance, and
restrictions on animal grazing and tree cutting” (US Department of State 2006);
that “the Constitution contains consociational arrangements to promote peaceful
cooperation and power-sharing among political organisations” (NEPAD Secre-
tariat 2006a:36), an accommodation that is rendered meaningless by the fact that
the other political parties that ‘share power’ with the RPF are not fully independ-
ent of the ruling party (US Department of State 2006), while the main opposition
party, the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), remains banned; and that
the presidential elections of 2003 represented “the first time the incumbent head
of state was challenged” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:37), even though it was not
much of a challenge as Kagame won 95 per cent of the vote in an election that the
United States called “seriously marred” (US Department of State 2004).
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As Rwanda concluded the self-evaluation phase of the APRM, it awaited its
group of external reviewers which would form its own opinion about governance
in the country in order to advise on governance matters and “to build consensus
with the stakeholders on the remaining issues or challenge areas and the steps
that need to be taken to address them” (NEPAD Secretariat 2003a).
The Country Review Mission
The country review mission to Rwanda took place from April 18 to 30, 2005,
during which time the CRT held interviews with “all stakeholders” in Kigali,
enumerated as “Ministers, the Auditor General, parastatals, the National Bank of
Rwanda, the judiciary, the Rwanda Revenue Authority, parliamentarians, civil
society, business people, etc.” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:26). Two days were
spent on meetings in the 11 provinces outside the city of Kigali, meetings at
which civil society representation was “very weak” (Rutazana 2006:7). As the
CRT used two days for internal meetings, did not schedule work for the weekend,
and used the last Friday (April 29) for “sightseeing and recreation”, they effec-
tively had only seven days in which to conduct all their interviews. Although the
review team did meet with a wide range of people, one is left to wonder whether
the quality of the meetings did not suffer at the hands of quantity, especially con-
sidering that the CRT already spent so much of their time on “internal meetings,
visiting dignitaries, ceremonial events and recreation” (Gruzd, forthcoming).
Whatever the impact of these shortcomings, the CRM yielded a report that was
encouraging for its willingness to speak some uncomfortable truths about politics
and governance in Rwanda, a country described as having an environment in
which there is limited “political space for competition of ideas and power”
(NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:12). The report pointed to a score of more specific
problems, such as allegations that the gacaca courts (newly revived commu-
nity-based courts to deal with genocide issues) were being used to exact victors’
justice, as they focused exclusively on the actions of the genocidaires during the
1990s and deliberately disregarded the atrocities committed by the RPF during
this period; the use of various schemes to prevent political parties from operating
freely, such as a prohibition on political activity below the provincial level and
the regulation of political competition and expression through the Forum on Po-
litical Parties to which all parties are forced to belong; the government’s “cau-
tiousness on press freedom” and the practice of self-censorship among
journalists; the “compromised” independence of the judiciary at the hands of a
powerful executive; and endemic social discrimination against women (ibid
2006a:12–13; 35–49). It should be pointed out that even though the CRT’s re-
marks were surprisingly critical, they were not at all original as they presented
criticism that is readily available in the grey and academic literatures, such as
Reyntjens (2004, 2006), and various downloadable reports by Amnesty Interna-
tional, the European Union, Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis
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Group, and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by the US Depart-
ment of State.
However, despite the CRT’s willingness to highlight political problems in
Rwanda, its report is inadequate for a number of reasons. First, although part of
the CRM’s brief was to “ascertain that Rwanda’s National Assessment Process
was technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation” (NEPAD
Secretariat 2006a:11), it fails to evaluate the Rwandan self-assessment process in
its report. This failure occurred even though the APRM country support mission
had earlier expressed concern about the large number of government officials on
the National Commission and had suggested that the National Commission be re-
arranged to give civil society greater influence, which the Rwandans did not do,
and so did nothing to diminish the impression that the process was indeed ‘politi-
cally manipulated’. The consequences showed up in a CSAR that lacks credibil-
ity for its overlooking of various political problems in Rwanda and its upbeat
view of political governance in the country, as was pointed out at the end of the
previous section.
Second, despite expressing concern about “the voting system in local communi-
ties and the capacity of the Electoral Commission” (ibid 2006a:12), these and
other electoral issues receive no elaboration in the CRT’s report, only for the is-
sue of elections to surface later in the form of suggestions about strengthening the
Electoral Commission. In other words, in the country review report, neither the
CRT nor the Rwandan government divulge anything about the seriously flawed
presidential and parliamentary elections of 2003 (European Union Electoral Ob-
server Mission 2003b, Reyntjens 2004; Samset and Dalby 2003). Instead, we are
led to believe that the main electoral problem is the lack of ‘capacity’ of the Elec-
toral Commission – which seems inaccurate given that the 2003 elections were
peaceful and well organised – rather than the government’s general closing down
of political space, as recognised elsewhere in the same paragraph of the CRT’s
report. If there is a problem with the Electoral Commission, it is the organisa-
tion’s lack of independence from the government, as suggested by its echoing of
government opinions on its website (Jordaan 2006:347); its role in helping the in-
cumbent RPF control and manipulate the 2001 district elections (International
Crisis Group 2001:10–14); and its biased monitoring of politicians during the
2003 elections, during which time “arrests, interrogations, and summons were re-
ported on the part of many opposition candidates, in particular those with a clear
political standing and history, [while] hardly any were reported on the RPF side”
(Samset and Dalby 2003:16).
Third, the country review report is silent on the conflict in the Great Lakes region
and Rwanda’s role in it, save for making the rather facile recommendation that
the Rwandan government should “[t]ighten regional security links, promote so-
cial relations between populations in border areas, and contribute towards finding
sub-regional mechanisms to curtail trafficking of small arms” (NEPAD Secretar-
iat 2006a:36).
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Fourth, the CRT informs us that “Rwanda is making progress with freedom of the
expression” and then cites the new press law and the creation of the High Council
of the Press as evidence. Yet not a word is breathed about the government’s past
and ongoing harassment and persecution of journalists (see Reporters Without
Borders 2006a, 2006b). Indeed, Reporters Without Borders have reached a con-
clusion contrary to that of the CRT: “Rwanda’s last remaining independent news-
papers have to struggle to survive in an increasingly hostile climate” (Reporters
Without Borders 2006b, emphasis added).
Fifth, the CRT delivers some dubious analysis, primarily because it views the
creation of new laws and institutional bodies as evidence of democratic progress,
and so appears oblivious of the fact that African governments are notorious for
creating a façade of bureaucratic institutions, officiousness and officialese behind
which informal channels are used for the actual exertion of authority and distri-
bution of benefits (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999). The
CRT’s faith in legal text leads them to claim that because “Rwanda has ratified
almost all the standards and codes provided in the APRM questionnaire” the
country “demonstrates a good example of political will to adhere to the rule of
law and good political governance” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:11–12). Simi-
larly, the CRT thinks that because a constitution was adopted through a referen-
dum, “efforts are being made to promote constitutional democracy in Rwanda”
(ibid:12). Elsewhere, the CRT asserts that “Rwanda is making progress with free-
dom of the ... Press” because “a new Press law was established in 2003, and a
High Council of the Press was set up to authorise and approve various permits”
(ibid). The CRT also argues that the “independence of the judiciary is compro-
mised ... because there is no Judicial Service Commission” (ibid:13).
Sixth, when the CRT does pause to wonder why the laws that do exist are not
working as they are supposed to, they refuse to lay the blame too specifically and
typically prefer to invoke lack of capacity, in other words, pinning the problem
on something for which no one is directly to blame. This is particularly cowardly
with regard to the violation of political rights and freedoms, for these abuses, as
violations of so-called negative rights, already imply ‘capacity’ and an identifi-
able perpetrator or unjust law. The following is a particularly clear example of
apportioning blame in this way:
Another issue discussed in detail during the CRM was the limited extent
to which Rwanda had actually implemented the international conven-
tions and protocols [on democracy and political governance] to which the
country had already acceded.... The CRM learned that the discrepancy
was explained by a lack of appropriate capacity to complete the pro-
cesses. (ibid:31)
Elsewhere, the lack of capacity is explicitly blamed for the woes of the Electoral
Commission (ibid:38), the judiciary (p.43), the civil service (p.45), the ombuds-
man (p.46), and the relative ineffectiveness of women in parliament (p.48).
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Seventh, shorn of its punitive capacity, the APRM is now presented as an institu-
tion intended to assist countries under review in “enhancing progress in key gov-
ernance and socio-economic development areas” (NEPAD Secretariat 2005c),
which requires the CRT to “recommend further actions that should be taken in
the final programme of action” (ibid:21). However, most of the ‘recommenda-
tions’ made by the CRT strike me as being of limited use and often err by being
vapid: the Rwandan government is advised to “[a]dapt and harmonise its laws to
be consistent with international commitments, while giving due attention to its
own realities” (ibid:32); tautological: executive influence on judicial branch can
be overcome by ensuring that “[t]he Supreme Court and the judiciary are inde-
pendent of the executive branch” (p.43); naïve: the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan
government should “ensure that its policy of inclusiveness wins the trust of all
citizens, both victims and perpetrators of genocide” (p.35); officious: the govern-
ment should “[s]et up an inter-ministerial structure to coordinate actions to en-
hance the rights of its citizens” (p.32); and obvious: “[t]he Electoral Commission
[should] respect the principle of a secret ballot” (p.38), and so on.
Given all these problems with the CRT’s report, it would be a stretch to claim
that it was “clear on a number of points in instances where problems are identi-
fied” as the APRM base document required it to be. Moreover, the CRT’s report
did not fulfil its instructions to indicate whether there was “the will on the part of
the Government to take the necessary decisions and measures to put right what
[was] identified to be amiss” (NEPAD Secretariat 2002a), as the Rwandan gov-
ernment hid its recalcitrance behind an apparent dispute over the CRT’s findings.
Rwanda’s Response to the Country Review Mission’s Findings
As mentioned, the government under review is offered the opportunity to respond
to the CRT’s findings so as ‘to ensure the accuracy of the information’ and to ap-
pend their response to the report. As the peer review process is one of “construc-
tive peer dialogue and persuasion” (NEPAD Secretariat 2003a), the
disagreements between the APRM and the government under review would have
to be overcome for the process to advance. Rwanda’s response on issues related
to democracy and good political governance centred on three themes: gacaca
courts as an instrument of victor’s justice; the closing down of political freedom;
and concerns about executive influence on the judicial branch of government. On
all three counts, the Rwandan response is unsatisfactory.
Regarding the first of these themes, as the Rwandan court system proved unable
to cope with the enormous load of genocide cases,3 more than 12 000 gacaca
courts were created to address genocide-related crimes (US Department of State
2006). While the gacaca courts have been hailed as an innovative albeit imperfect
way of alleviating the pressure on the court system, the CRT pointed to the im-
pression that “the Gacaca courts are a camouflage for ‘victors’ justice’, since the
crimes committed during the RPF’s incursion and takeover in Rwanda in the
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1990s may go unpunished while the focus remains on the genocidaires” (NEPAD
Secretariat 2006a:35; on RPF atrocities, see Des Forges 1999). Indeed, the CRT’s
impression that the gacaca system is blind to the massacres perpetrated by the
Tutsi-dominated RPF is one that is widely shared (Corey and Joireman
2004:86–9; Morrill 2006; Ooman 2005:905–6; Uvin and Mironko 2003:227).
Strengthening these suspicions, Morrill (2006) reports how the language of the
Gacaca Law was adjusted in 2004 so as to shift the focus of the trials to Tutsi
victimhood, thus sidelining the cases of Hutu moderates who suffered at the
hands of the genocidaires and of Hutu civilians who were murdered by the RPF.
Moreover, by confining the jurisdiction of the gacaca courts to crimes committed
between October 1 and December 31, 1994, it excludes the cases of “[t]ens of
thousands of civilians, possibly more than 100 000 [who] were massacred by the
RPF after the resumption of the war, between April and September 1994”
(Reyntjens 2004:194; Corey and Joireman 2004:86). So, even though the current
Rwandan government repeatedly insists that a “pursuit of national unity and rec-
onciliation of all Rwandans is a priority” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:132), it is
hard to fault Corey and Joireman’s diagnosis that “[t]he exclusion of [Tutsi/RPF]
crimes from the gacaca process establishes an ethnic divide and amounts to an
unequal application of the law” and will have the opposite effect – a “politicised
application of justice [that] will ultimately undermine the security of both Hutus
and Tutsis within Rwanda” (Corey and Joireman 2004:86).
Nevertheless, the Rwandan government remains unmoved about concerns over
the gacaca’s focus on Tutsi suffering and insists that “the Gacaca court jurisdic-
tion is mandated to address the special cases of genocide suspects only” (ibid).
The Rwandan government goes on to note that “[a]ll other cases are still handled
through the classical justice system” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:132), an empty
gesture considering that this system is so overburdened (the reason why the
gacaca system was created in the first place) that these ‘other cases’ are unlikely
ever to be heard (Uvin and Mironko 2003:227). What is also worrying is that in
the next paragraph the Rwandan government tries to dismiss those who question
the working of the gacaca courts as “people who are interested in seeing
Rwanda’s genocide go unpunished” (ibid:133). On other occasions the Rwandan
government has branded human rights organisations that have called for an in-
vestigation into human rights violations by RPF troops during the genocide as
‘divisionists’ (US Department of State 2006). But, contrary to what the Rwandan
government thinks, what these critics want is that
all individuals should be held accountable for their actions. Indeed na-
tional reconciliation demands that individual Tutsis must bear the re-
sponsibility for crimes committed against civilians during and after the
genocide just as individual Hutus are held accountable for their crimes.
(Corey and Joireman 2004:86)
Be that as it may, the Rwandan government’s depiction of critics of the gacaca
system as people who would like to render the genocide “unknown, with a view
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to revise it in history” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:133) fits into a familiar pattern
whereby the Rwandan government attacks the integrity of its critics4 and at the
same time milks international sensitivity and shame about the genocide for all its
worth – what Reyntjens has called an exploitation of its “genocide credit”
(Reyntjens 2004:199). It is also ironic that the Rwandan government would
charge its critics with revisionism, for the Rwandan government’s own manipula-
tion and sanitation of the country’s history, especially with regard to atrocities
committed by the RPF, have been well documented (Pottier 2002; Corey and
Joireman 2004; Buckley-Zistel 2006). Indeed, the gacaca process has given the
Rwandan government another opportunity for imposing its version of the truth.
As Oomen (2005:906) puts it, “the gacaca are hardly about eradicating the cul-
ture of impunity but rather about tightening the control of a minority government
and about passing down its imagery of Rwandan identity”.
With regard to the second theme, the limits on political freedom in Rwanda, the
CRT noted that “political parties are not allowed to operate at the grassroots be-
low the provincial levels” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:37). Indeed, during the
transitional period, which ended in July 2003, political parties had agreed to a
moratorium on political organisation and recruitment at the grassroots level, an
agreement that was flouted by the incumbent RPF as it actively recruited new
members and pushed its favourites into local positions of power (International
Crisis Group 2001; Human Rights Watch 2003). Moreover, the period leading up
to the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2003 saw the banning of the
MDR, the strongest electoral threat to the RPF, while critical journalists and hu-
man rights activists had to endure constant harassment from the government (Hu-
man Rights Watch 2003). Since the 2003 elections, government harassment of
former members of the MDR and of independent journalists and human rights or-
ganisations has continued, while there are 10 political prisoners according to
most recent reports (US Department of State 2006). Those parties that are indeed
allowed to operate are “not considered to be fully independent of President
Kagame and the RPF” (ibid). In the absence of true opposition parties, one might
wonder about the political role and influence of local human rights NGOs, espe-
cially since the officially endorsed National Commission for Human Rights
“acted more as a public relations organ of the government”(ibid).5 Unfortunately,
what one would find is that these organisations have, under immense pressure
from the government, retreated to such an extent that all but a few
investigate and document violations by the state, preferring instead to fo-
cus on abuses by non-state actors (such as domestic violence). Out of
self-preservation, they now shy away from vigorous human rights advo-
cacy and concentrate on non-confrontational activities such as humani-
tarian assistance and human rights education and training. (Front Line
2005:32)
In the light of these alleged constraints on political activity, the Rwandan govern-
ment’s response to the charge of restricting grassroots political activity is rather
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crafty, for it denies and acknowledges the charge from one sentence to the next:
“[t]here is currently no evidence of inhibition to [sic] the practice of vibrant polit-
ical party activities at the grassroots. Nonetheless, the government of Rwanda re-
cognises that this innovation [?] may be short of meeting international standards”
(NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:133). The Rwandan government then tries to set our
minds at ease with a truly vacuous commitment “to periodically assess the consti-
tutional instrument [?] through a proper legal framework” (ibid).
A further aspect of the CRT’s concerns about the limits to political freedom in
Rwanda concerns the oversight role played by the Forum for Political Parties
(ibid:37–8). The forum is a body to which all political parties are forced to belong
and which monitors the behaviour of political parties in the country. In the
Rwandan government’s sanguine view, the forum is
an innovative creation of Rwandans for internal peer review and sharing
of best practices in national political activity. After terrible experiences
with exclusion and conflict, Rwandans have chosen inclusion and con-
sensus building. The Forum is part of a package of innovations to consoli-
date constructive ideas even from minority parties, rather than isolate
them. (ibid:134)
Despite pretensions of “power sharing”, the forum is dominated by the RPF and
instead so tightly ‘peer reviews’ other parties, which are not wholly independent
of the RPF to begin with, that it in effect restricts political pluralism. So, however
legitimate concerns are over national unity, the fact remains that the forum con-
flicts with and stifles the liberal elements of the Rwandan Constitution as well as
the political principles stipulated in the Declaration on Democracy, Political,
Economic and Corporate Governance (NEPAD Secretariat 2002b).
The third theme of Rwanda’s response to the findings of the CRT on political
governance in the country relates to executive dominance of the judicial branch,
especially in so far as the
judiciary is in practice an appointee of the executive branch. Besides
nominating both the president and the deputy president of the Supreme
Court for election by the Senate, the President of the Republic makes the
final appointment. Subsequently, the president of the Supreme Court pre-
sides over the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, a powerful body with re-
sponsibility to appoint and discipline judges and other judicial officers.
(NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:42)
The Rwandan government defends this practice (outlined by Article 88 of the
Constitution) by noting that the President always nominates two candidates for
both the positions of president and deputy president of the Supreme Court, whose
suitability is “rigorously” debated in the Senate, which “must approve the most
qualified candidates before being proposed for appointment by the President of
the Republic” (ibid:134). However, presenting the Senate as a check on executive
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power is misleading: out of the 26 seats in the Senate, 14 are elected while 12 are
appointed; eight by the President and four by the Forum of Political Parties, a
body dominated by President Kagame’s RPF. Furthermore, of the 14 elected
seats, 12 are elected by an electoral college made up of local officials in each of
the 12 provinces, a sphere in which the RPF had entrenched their dominance dur-
ing the transitional period by ignoring the ban on grassroots political activity
(Front Line 2005:22, note 50; Human Rights Watch 2003; International Crisis
Group 2001; Samset and Dalby 2003:23, 26).
Although the quality and accuracy of Rwanda’s responses to the CRT’s findings
left much to be desired, it did not prevent the Rwandan government from ques-
tioning the competence and objectivity of the team that compiled the country re-
view report, which was done partly to pave the way for the Rwandan government
to ignore the CRT’s criticisms. In a reflection on the APRM process in Rwanda,
an ‘outcome report for experience sharing’, the Rwandan government claims
that,
given the recent history of Rwanda, it seemed as if some external review-
ers came with inadequate knowledge of the country, and perhaps even
some preconceived ideas based on inaccurate information about the
country found in different media like the Internet [which, incidentally, is
where the report under citation was found]. (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat
2006a:8; NEPAD Secretariat 2005b)
As mentioned above, government attacks on the integrity of critical researchers
have become a predictable response to criticism. To compensate for the review-
ers’ “inadequate knowledge” and “preconceived ideas” and since the Rwandan
government defines objectivity as that which casts it in a positive light, it pro-
poses that a “minimum requirement for objectivity should also mean that the fi-
nal report, the APR Panel report, be subjected to a process of moderation before
it is tabled before the Heads of State” (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:9).
Moreover, under the guise of saving valuable time during the country review
visit, the Rwandan government has suggested that “local experts could be re-
cruited as counterpart experts to the panel of external reviewers, providing them
information that often takes long to gather” (ibid:10).
What has emerged in this section is that, at the end of the third phase of the
APRM process, the Rwandan government was still at considerable variance with
the country review team (and therefore with the APR Panel), of whose compe-
tence and findings on political governance the Rwandan government remained
unconvinced. What remains to be seen is how this standoff played out during the
next stages.
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Ratifying a Watered-Down Report
The fourth phase of Rwanda’s peer review culminated in the presentation of the
APR Panel’s report (compiled by the CRT) and the country under review’s final
programme of action to the APRM Forum in Abuja in June 2005. At this meet-
ing, as in their report, the APR Panel identified the three most problematic as-
pects of political governance in Rwanda as being the gacaca court system,
executive influence on the judiciary, and political pluralism (ibid:152; NEPAD
Secretariat 2005b). In other words, the Rwandan government and the external re-
viewers remained at loggerheads given their conflicting assessments of these
three aspects of political governance in the country.
In his response to the findings of the APR Panel at the Abuja meeting, the
Rwandan President Paul Kagame noted that while “Rwanda was broadly in
agreement with the report” he would use his speech to “correct some errors in the
[APR Panel’s] report and to improve on its quality” (NEPAD Secretariat 2005b).
Kagame then proceeded to dispute the report’s findings, including what was
identified above as the three most problematic aspects of political governance in
Rwanda. Kagame stated that
the review team, given the short time, may not have been able to appreci-
ate ongoing innovative measures and processes e.g. those relating to free-
dom of the media, the procedure for appointment of Supreme Court
judges and provisions for power-sharing between political parties where
the winner does not take all. He noted that the Forum of Political Parties
was an initiative to provide for debate of national issues among political
parties, including those not represented in parliament; while consensus is
sought, this is not ‘absolute’. Commenting on the innovative instruments
of governance, the President believed that the innovative instruments of
governance may not have been well captured. For example, Gacaca is
dictated by the special circumstances of trying to bring justice to the
hundreds of thousands of genocide cases. Rwanda does not see it as a
panacea. Furthermore, Rwanda’s constitution is informed by its history
and contains specific provisions that the Government of Rwanda should
be given the opportunity to explain fully. (ibid)
With Kagame’s comments being what one would have expected, the gap between
the Rwandan government and the APR Panel’s assessments of political gover-
nance in Rwanda remained. But, since the APRM has been recast in terms of
consensus and cooperation, something had to give. And, perhaps recognising that
they could do nothing about a defiant Rwandan government, the APR Panel,
armed with nothing more than a measure of moral authority derived from their
presumed ‘eminence’, relented. The APRM’s retreat can be found in an adden-
dum to the country review report, titled “Comments from APRM Panel after sub-
mission of reports to APR Forum” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:152–3). Here the
APR Panel informs us that after their report was presented in Abuja and after
Kagame suggested that some aspects of political governance in Rwanda were
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misrepresented, the APRM “closely examined” the issues relating to the gacaca
courts, judicial independence, and political pluralism and subsequently decided
to add an addendum to the final country report to “clarify” matters (ibid:152).
The way in which the APRM’s ‘clarification’ resolved the tension between itself
and the Rwandan government was to say nothing more of the gacaca courts; ac-
cept the Rwandan government’s interpretation of the relationship between the ex-
ecutive and the judiciary; and beat about the bush with regard to the stifling effect
that Rwanda’s Forum for Political Parties has on political pluralism.
On the issue of judicial independence it will be recalled that the CRT’s concern
stemmed from a view that the Rwandan President dominated the appointment of
the president and vice-president of the Supreme Court, which in turn gave him in-
ordinate sway over judges. However, the APR Panel retracted this criticism and
aligned its view with that of the Rwandan government by noting “that the
Rwandan system of judicial appointments was comparable to that of many coun-
tries, including developed countries” (ibid:152; see also p.134). To be sure, in the
United States, for example, the President also nominates Supreme Court judges
for consideration by the Senate. However, unlike its Rwandan counterpart, the
US Senate is not a presidential lapdog, as Harriet Miers recently found out. Fol-
lowing the APR Panel’s unwarranted and ignominious approval of Rwanda’s
manner of judicial appointments, in the next sentence, the panel encourages the
Rwandan government to “pursue its efforts towards good governance. This may
lead the [Government of Rwanda] to set new international benchmarks in the
matter of judicial independence” (ibid:152). If this is the quality of “peer learning
and experience sharing”, then perhaps we are better off without.
With regard to the role played by the Forum for Political Parties, the APR Panel
stood by the CRT’s view that the strict way in which the forum regulates the ac-
tivities of political parties amounts to a suppression of political pluralism. Never-
theless, things come unstuck when the APR Panel asserts,
[I]t was accepted that the activities of the Consultative Forum was not in
conflict with the those of parliament (as alluded to in the Panel’s report).
The point was well taken that the Consultative Forum acts more like a
hearing to influence the parliament which remains independent. (ibid)
So, instead of demanding that the forum be scrapped or at least drastically re-
formed, the panel uses an ‘allusion’ in the CRT’s report to change the topic to the
relationship between the forum and parliament. However, the CRT’s report con-
tained no allusion to the relationship between the forum and the Rwandan parlia-
ment;6 reference to such an allusion merely served as a pretext for the toothless
APR Panel to equivocate and save face, and, in doing so, it actually furnished the
Rwandan government with a certain amount of justification for maintaining the
Forum for Political Parties. Powerless but posturing, the APR Panel proceeds to
‘recommend’ that the authoritarian Rwandan government becomes a little less
authoritarian: “[T]he Panel recommends that the Government of Rwanda and the
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Parliament of Rwanda encourage all parties to participate freely and openly in the
Forum consultations and avoid adhering to a tight framework within which par-
ties have difficulty operating freely” (ibid:152–3).
However, the biggest indictment of the APRM is not its retreat in the face of a de-
fiant Rwandan government or the feebleness of its advice, but its ratification of a
Rwandan programme of action that flatly ignores the issue of political freedom.
From the beginning we have been told that the aim of the APRM was to help Af-
rican states improve their governance in terms of mutually agreed upon objec-
tives, including democracy and good political governance; democracy was even
identified as a “precondition” for poverty eradication and sustainable develop-
ment (NEPAD Secretariat 2003c). With this goal in mind, each country’s
programme of action would stipulate how it intended to achieve the various
NEPAD objectives after a process of self and peer review. According to the
Rwandan government, “The major objective of [the] APRM plan of action is to
bridge governance gaps identified in the APRM self-assessment process and the
entire peer review exercise” (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:15). Despite the
importance of the programme of action, Rwanda’s programme contains a funda-
mental and telling omission: of the nine objectives that pertain to democracy and
political governance, the two that deal most directly with political freedom are
simply omitted, while the other seven objectives are addressed. The two omitted
objectives read: “Constitutional democracy, including periodic political competi-
tion and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, citizen rights and supremacy of
the Constitution” (the second objective) and “Promotion and protection of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, civil and political rights as enshrined in African
and international human rights instruments” (the third objective) (NEPAD Secre-
tariat 2005:29–32). So, while the Rwandan programme of action has a fair
amount to say about other political objectives such as better public service and
the generic rights of women and children, it simply thumbs its nose at a power-
less APRM as it makes its intention clear to continue disrespecting the political
rights and freedoms of its citizens.
With the tabling and ratification of the final report and plan of action at the APR
Forum meeting in Banjul in June 2006, African leaders gave Rwanda’s disdain
for political rights and freedom an official thumbs up. It is, however, not clear
whether Rwanda’s completion of the peer review process has resulted in benefits
more tangible than the moral and political smokescreen proffered by the APRM,
even though Rwanda’s development partners have “pledged their support for the
implementation of the APRM programme of action to cover the identified gaps in
the [self-assessment] report” (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat 2007:7).
Concluding Remarks
I have described how the APRM has failed to bring a politically oppressive gov-
ernment to heel, a failure that has been presented in terms of a pan-African body
too weak and unwilling to challenge the sovereignty of a deviant government.
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The APRM’s failure on Rwanda cannot be put down to capacity problems at the
body’s continental secretariat or the questionable competence of the review team
that went to Rwanda. Rather, the APRM’s weakness stems from a shrunken man-
date and an inability to impose penalties on governments under review.
One final point needs to be made. It could be argued that the endorsement of a
politically oppressive regime, such as the one in Rwanda, is consistent with
(some of) the principles of the APRM. To explain: the APRM has since its incep-
tion been ambivalent about what the goal of political governance should be; spe-
cifically whether it should be political stability or democracy. On the one hand,
the APRM base document asserts, “[t]he primary purpose of the APRM is to fos-
ter the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability”
(NEPAD Secretariat 2002a, emphasis added), while, on the other hand, we are
informed that “[t]he overall objective is to consolidate a constitutional order in
which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of
powers and effective, responsive public service are realised to ensure sustainable
development and a peaceful and stable society” (NEPAD Secretariat 2003c, em-
phasis added). However, the goals of political stability and democracy are clearly
not the same thing and pursuit of them could even pull in opposite directions. In-
deed, the Rwandan government consistently presents these two goals as being in
tension, as when it uses concerns over national unity to justify its suppression of
political freedom, or ‘divisiveness’, as it terms expressions of political freedom
that it finds disagreeable, as the CRT also noted (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:38).
The APRM’s (ambivalent) endorsement of political stability as the primary goal
of political governance meant that Rwanda could draw on the APRM’s stated
aims to legitimise its preference for ‘political stability’. The presence of such am-
bivalence in the APRM documents also enabled Rwanda’s peers to claim
non-culpability for allowing political stability to trump political freedom in the
Rwandan peer review.
If I am correct in charging that the priority of political stability over political free-
dom and democracy has been written into, or at least enabled by, the APRM doc-
uments, then these are flawed and indeed dangerous documents. If I am wrong in
this characterisation of the APRM’s political principles, and democracy and po-
litical freedom are indeed the lead principles, then the fact remains that the
APRM will not make any headway in establishing these principles in Rwanda,
and has therefore been of no value to anyone except the Rwandan government,
whose fiction of openness has been given an alibi by Africa’s leaders.
Notes
1. With regard to ‘divisionism’ Article 33 of the Constitution states, “Propagation of ethnic, re-
gional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division is punishable by law”.
2. Various members of Rwanda’s APR Focal Point failed to respond to my requests for a copy of
Rwanda’s CSAR. However, the content of the CSAR can be deduced from the country review
report on Rwanda. This useful document relays the findings of Rwanda’s self-assessment, as
well of those of the CRT. It further contains three addenda: Rwanda’s response to the CRT,
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the APR Panel’s reponse to the Rwandan response, and Rwanda’s programme of action
(NEPAD Secretariat 2006).
3. The ICTR has been widely criticised for the slowness of its work as, between 1994 and 2005,
it handed down a mere 20 judgements in 27 cases (US State Department 2006; Uvin and
Mironko 2003:220).
4. The Rwandan government’s favourite strategy is to accuse its critics of ‘divisionism’ or propa-
gating ‘genocide ideology’. For example, in 2004, a parliamentary report accused
LIPRODHOR (Rwanda’s most independent human rights organisation), Umeseso (Rwanda’s
most independent newspaper), CARE, Trocaire, the BBC, Voice of America, and a number of
Christian churches of propagating genocide ideology (Front Line 2005:19).
5. The human rights organisation Front Line (2005:36) reports, “In 2003, the Rwandan Human
Rights Commission issued only four communiqués: one attacking Human Rights Watch for
supporting divisionism, one attacking former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu for divi-
sionism during his election campaign against President Kagame, and two others praising the
presidential and parliamentary elections”.
6. The only place where the CRT report mentions the Forum for Political Parties and the
Rwandan parliament in the same breath is in a rather cryptic paragraph, “To illustrate the
point, the CRM found that, although the current parliament comprises both the opposition and
the governing party, the numbers are patently weighted in favour of the governing party. This
is in addition to the extremely difficult conditions in the Constitution attendant on party activi-
ties. Political parties may be de jure authorised but de facto imposible to realise and operate
freely” (NEPAD Secretariat 2006a:38).
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